Some military communications systems have requirements quite different from civilian systems. Among others there is the necessity to protect military communications from detection, interception, exploitation, or disruption by adversaries, particularly during times of hostilities. There are a number of techniques available to protect communications against these threats. Some of them can benefit from unambiguous time information.
INTRODUCTION
Military communications must be capable of operating within environments more difficult than are experienced by civilian systems. During times of hostilities, adversaries will attempt to intercept, disrupt or manipulate messages. These threats must be protected against. The techniques used to achieve these protection levels often have large costs including dollars, technical complexity and labor intensity. One of these costs can involve the use of precise time information.
(Throughout this paper all references to "time" must be understood as referring to the internationally accepted and disseminated Coordinated Universal Time or simply UTC). The use of time can be extremely beneficial for initial alignment of long PN (Pseudo Noise) codes used in encryption and the demodulation of the non-cw or broadband carriers used in what is commonly referred to as spread-spectrum communications. A good initial alignment of codes can significantly reduce the search times for a perfect match between the codes, at which point tracking of the incoming code can commence. This paper discusses this subject through an examination of the hypothetical military communications system of Figure 1 . The communications system illustrated here may not accurately represent most present day operational systems. It should, however, for those *Contribution of the NBS, not subject to copyright. systems using very long, non-self-synchronous PN codes, be adequate to focus on the discussions intended for this paper.
PROTECTION TECHNIQUES
Specifically, some military communication systems may require protection against one or more of the following threats:
1. Eavesdropping by either direct wiretap or radio intercept.
2. Message manipulation, deletion, or replay through active wiretap or radio transmission.
3. Detection, frequency estimation, and direction finding of the radiation.
Jamming.
The techniques used to achieve some degree of protection against these various threats can include the application of suitable encryption techniques and/or the use of non-cw or broadband carriers (in contrast to the very familiar use of the so-called cw carrier). The specific threats rendered less effective using one or both of the previously mentioned protection measures are summarized in Table 1 In the generic military communications system of Figure 1 , the digital data are encrypted by being combined with the output of a PN generator. The result is passed through a channel encoder and interleaver, both used to improve bit error rate performances, prior to being passed to the final stage consisting of modulation, upconversion, and power amplification. The carrier's characteristics (frequency, phase, or time of activation) are a function of the state of the second PN generator. The output of the power amplifier and antenna is propagated to a receiver where this process is, step-by-step, unraveled in reverse order. Demodulation requires a synchronized PN generator, that is, one which is tracking in phase with the transmitting PN generator delayed by equipment delays and the propagatiop delays between the transmitter and receiver. The details of how the synchronized PN sequence is, in fact, utilized in the final demodulation process depends on whether the PN sequence has controlled the frequency, phase, or time of transmission of the data. The principle remains the same, however, the generation of the receiver's PN sequence must be synchronized to Table 1 can be protected against through the use of broadband carriers. A broadband carrier is defined in this paper as one in which the carrier's frequency, phase, or time of transmission is determined by a pseudorandom sequence. Broadband carriers considered here fall into three distinct categories: a frequency-hopping carrier, a timehopping carrier, and a phase hopping carrier. The frequency-hopping carrier may be generated in the manner shown in Figure 3 . The output is a signal whose carrier is hopped about in frequency in an apparently random manner but which, in reality, is determined by the output PN sequence generator, which is a deterministic process. This constant, apparently random, hopping in frequency of the signal, as illustrated in Figure 3 , makes the successful execution of the previously mentioned threats much more difficult. The number of frequencies possible is n and the frequency used is determined from m bits, of the PN sequence where 2m = n, making prediction of the next frequency to be used extremely difficult.
The phase-hopping carrier is typically a system where the phase of the carrier is either zero or 180 degrees, depending upon whether the PN sequence bit is a zero or a one as shown in Figure  4 . The PN sequence typically runs at a much higher rate than the data, usually 100 to 1000 times, with a correspondingly wider signal spectrum than that expected for the data alone. This spectrum is more difficult to detect or identify since it looks like noise, is broadband, and can be suCcessfully transmitted between two friendly,cooperating terminals at carrier power-to-noise-density ratios much lower than required in conventional systems where bandwidths are conserved.
In the case of a time-hopping carrier, the time slots for transmission can be thought of as slots with many cells, only one of which will contain the transmission. The cell to be used in each slot is determined by the state of the PN sequence, thus appearing to be selected at random, as seen in Figure 5 . A jammer, for example, must waste power by transmitting his jamming signal at times when there is no signal to jam. All threats to this type of communications system are made less effective due to the uncertainties associated with transmission times. There can also be hybrids of these three systems. For example, a time hopper which is also frequency hopped would potentionally be more resistant to all threats considered here.
CODE ALIGNMENT
In each of the protection techniques discussed above, the long, locally generated, pseudorandom sequence was assumed to be synchronized, or in phase, and tracking the incoming signal. As mentioned before, it is not always the case that the codes will be tracking or even close to being in phase synchronization.
This might be the case because the receiver's operator has just turned on his radio while the network has been operating and using the code for a long time, possibly days; or the user's receiver might have malfunctioned, lost power or for some other reason need restarting. In any case, there can be instances where the user's code will be out of phase by a relatively large amount of time or, equivalently, a very large number of bits. The process of achieving coarse phase synchronization, which is a bit-by-bit search, can be prohibitively time consuming.
Alignment of long codes may be done in a three-step process. Initial code alignment is defined in this paper as bringing the locally generated code close to phase alignment using external information, such as a time reference. Initial alignment is followed by coarse code alignment, which is the process of achieving alignment within plus or minus of one bit, where fine alignment or tracking, the third step, can be implemented using tracking circuits. (In spread-spectrum systems, it is common to call one bit of a PN sequence a chip with many chips making up one bit of data. In this paper, however, one symbol of the PN sequence will still be referred to as a PN bit, or simply a bit). Figure 6 illustrates these three steps. In Figure 6a, Figure  6b . Figure 6c shows the locally generated sequence with an alignment error of approximately one second, a small time uncertainty easily achieved by reference to a good quality quartz wrist watch. Figure 6d shows the alignment error reduced by reference to a better time source, such as that broadcast by WWV or GOES. The alignment error is shown in Figure 6e to be further reduced to plus-or-minus one bit through a bit-by-bit search, as indicated by a correlation process where correctly decoded data appears in the baseband. The final phase of fine alignment or code tracking is shown in Figure 6f .
Continuing with the process illustrated in Figure 6 , let us again assume that the receiver's internally generated code is not aligned or CT C\j cm cn~~~~~~U a Additionally, a tim'e signal is also available at 20.0 MHz. from WWV only. These signals are generally available throughout the world using relatively inexpensive equipment. Voice announcements of time and a time code are included. Many other countries also offer similar HF time services, many on these same frequencies, with different formats and in many cases only during limited hours of the day. The accuracy of high frequency time signals is generally about one millisecond, provided that the propagation times are correctly determined--usually by calculation. Figure 7 illustrates the format of WWV and WWVH.
LORAN-C stands for LOng RAnge Navigation and is a hyperbolic navigation system operating at 100 kHz. For timing use, good ground wave coverage is available in large areas of the Northern Hemisphere. An approximate ground wave timing coverage is illustrated in Figure 8 . The timing coverage is considerably greater than that for ground wave navigation coverage (not shown), since only one station needs to be received rather than three, as required for navigation. Using the ground wave, time accurate to one microsecond is possible provided that UTC time accurate to five milliseconds is initially available for resolving ambiguities. This additional requirement is necessary since an unambiguous time message is not included. The use of WWV for this initial timing purpose is quite common.
The U.S. Navy's Navigation Satellite System or, as it is better known, Transit is a system of five or six low-altitude, polar orbiting satellites providing navigation signals. Due to the nature of the system the satellites also provide time information in the navigation message that is required for proper processing of the navigation data. These satellites generally are in view of any point on the earth's surface for a few minutes up to as many as 20 minutes, with intervals between satellite passes of two to three hours. The orbits are illustrated in Figure  9 . The GOES satellites are two U.S. meteorological satellites in geostationary orbit which also provide time signals. These time signals are generated by NBS and relayed through the satellites, which are located on the equatorial plane at 135 and 75 degrees west longitude. From these locations a continuous time signal is available to North and South America and the major parts of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The coverage is shown in Figure 10 . These signals are generally accurate to 50 microseconds and available in the form Qf a continuous digital time code.
The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), prior to the cancellation of all scheduled shuttle launches after the loss of the Challenger with three Navstar satellites aboard, was to be fully operational by 1988 or 1989 with 18 satellites in 12-hour, highly inclined orbits. At present there are seven satellites providing limited service. The full constellation of satellites will broadcast navigation and time information on a continuous basis to the entire earth. These satellites, unlike LORAN-C and Transit, provide an unambiguous time message that can be related to UTC. The time signals are to be freely available to civil users on an international basis at the-highest level of accuracy consistent with U. S. national security interests. Recent statements by the DoD appear to place this level at one-quarter microsecond by using the C/A code. The signals are available on two frequencies using two codes, the coarse/acquisition or C/A code and the precise or P code. Higher levels of accuracy will be possible using both the C/A code and the P code. The P code, however, will be subject to restricted access.
29.2.10 The use of broadband carriers and encryption techniques to protect communications from specific threats can benefit from accurate time. We have shown how search times needed to align codes can be reduced from hours to seconds when the accuracy with which absolute time is known is improved from a few seconds to 50 microseconds. Sources of accurate time were discussed in terms of accuracy, cost, geographical location and signal availability.
